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Ethics in Project Management: some Aristotelian insights 
 
 
Project management has been acknowledged as an important knowledge field of 
study considering the huge socio-economic impact of projects on our lives and on 
society. Through projects we create our future (Bredillet, 2010). The project activities, 
situations and contexts are managed and lead by project managers, making decisions, 
using professional and / or industry standards practice, complying with all kind of 
regulatory rules and regulations, managing pluralistic or conflicting interests amongst 
various stakeholders, and committed to deliver the “best possible” outcome. Competent 
project managers are acknowledged as important actors leading to successful projects, 
and successful organizations (Crawford, 2005, p. 8). In our current way of apprehending 
the field, we face tensions between decision making based on facts i.e. what “is” and also 
on values i.e. “what ought be”, doing “right” i.e. using “ the right means” in practice, 
finding the “right” balance of duty towards stakeholders with pluralistic or conflicting 
interests, delivering the “right” outcome i.e. the best possible “end”. These tensions are 
all deeply rooted in ethics1.  
 
From dichotomous thinking to Ethics 
 
Therefore the underlying ethical approaches supporting the field, and consequently 
the practice, have immense impact.  
 
In order to specify what I mean by “field”, I use Audet’s definition of a knowledge 
field (Audet, 1986):  
 
“the space occupied by the whole of the people who claim to produce knowledge in 
this field, and this space is also a system of relationships between these people 
competing to gain control over the definition of the conditions and the rules of 
production of knowledge. (p. 42)” 
 
Projects and their management are still failing to deliver the expected value(s). 
Therefore, the field has been facing for years, since its inception I should write, number 
of questioning such as: is this a profession (Hodgson, 2002)? do the professional bodies 
reify the “discipline” (Hodgson, 2002)? are projects “objects”, contexts, or a name of a 
category of what people “do” (Blomquist et al., 2010; Bredillet, 2013; Hällgren & 
Söderholm, 2011; Hällgren & Lindahl, 2012)? is the body of knowledge built on too 
rationalist grounds and do we need more critical foundations (Bredillet, 2010; Cicmil, 
2006; Cicmil & Hodgson, 2006)? is there any theory of project management (Bredillet, 
                                                        
1 I focus in “ethics” in this article. As stated by van Staveren “There is a subtle but important difference 
between the concepts of ‘morality’ and ‘ethics’, which will be adhered to in this contribution. Morality is about 
the actual beliefs or specific actions of individuals in terms of good and bad, whereas ethics is more general 
and concerns a reflection on the reasons for or against certain moral beliefs or actions.” (2007, p. 21, note 1) 
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2004, 2010)? what is the value brought by standards and credentials (Bredillet, 2003; 
Hodgson & Cicmil, 2007)? how to train or educate project managers (Bourgault et al., 
2006; Lalonde et al, 2012)? do we need to rethink project management (Cicmil et al., 
2006; Winter et al. 2006)? or to reconstruct project management (Morris, 2013)?... This 
list is far from exhaustive, and raise ultimately the following question: what could offer 
research in order to fill the theory – practice gap and lead projects practice be to more 
successful and deliver better benefits?... Authors, modernists and post-modernists, have 
partially addressed these questions at the expense of holistic thinking (Bredillet et al., 
2013b).  
 
In fact, I argue that the fundamental dichotomy between theory and rigor vs. practice 
and relevance – and its related derivatives, with a focus of “practice”, such as scholar 
external to situations vs. practitioner natives of the situations, practice-turn anchored in 
social unconscious habitus vs. phronetic proposal emphasizing individual consciousness 
(Bredillet, 2013a, Bredillet et al., 2013c), individual lines of actions, i.e. performative vs. 
shared participants’ schemata i.e. ostensive routines, central prototypical vs. peripheral 
non-prototypical patterns of actions in routines (Dionysiou & Tsoukas, 2013) – as seen 
in our modern and postmodern time, one focusing on facts and the other on values, 
precludes project management to unveil its full socio-economical potential. On the one 
hand we face the assumptions underlying modern time, grounded in “unity-of-science 
dream of transforming and reducing all kinds of knowledge to one basic form and level” 
and cause-effects relationships (Eikeland, 2012, p. 20), and on the other, the postmodern 
time interpretivist proposal, and its “tendency to make all kinds of knowing equivalent” 
(Eikeland, 2012, p. 20). Van Staveren rightly points that the problem of this dichotomy 
between facts and values (Putnam, 2003) “is that one excludes the other and is also 
favoured over the other, often without any ground other than that the favoured notion is 
not the unflavoured notion” (van Staveren, 2007, p. 22). Few authors have attempted to 
move beyond this dichotomy modern vs. potsmodern: e.g. as Gauthier & Ika (2012) have 
focused on the importance to consider different ontological facets, and Boisot & 
McKelvey (2012) have suggested possible way to integrate the modernist and 
postmodernist perspectives, taking a complexity science lens. However, we are missing 
a fundamental underlying point having a profound impact on the field: “when the wise 
man points at the moon, the fool looks at his finger”.   
 
This fundamental underlying point is ethics. The purpose of this article is to discuss 
philosophically and illustrate through brief practical examples how an ethics 
perspective can lead to new balanced insights contrasting the above-mentioned limiting 
dichotomous thinking and eventually lead to an improvement of socio-economical 
impact made by the field.  
 
In order to do so, I call for Aristotelian ethical and practical philosophy. In this, I 
follow in this many authors building on pre-modern philosophies such as the 
Aristotelian one (e.g. Gadamer, 1975; Habermas, 1971 ; MacIntyre, 1985, 2007; Toulmin, 
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1990; Flyvbjerg, 2001; Blomquist et al., 2010; Lalonde et al., 2012; Nussbaum, 1978). 
Tsoukas & Cummings (1997) note: 
 
“The past decade has witnessed a number of interesting shifts in the way people think 
about organizations. One of the most curious is the way in which much of the ’new 
thinking’ is antithetical to mechanistic and rationalistic theories that have historically 
dominated organization and management studies. This paper investigates this shift, 
and argues that this new antithetical thinking can be interpreted as the re-surfacing, or 
recovery, of certain strands of Aristotelian philosophy, strands that were marginalized 
with the rise of scientific rationalism in the 17th century, before management and 
organization studies, as we tend to conceive of them, began. The discussion presented 
here demonstrates the traditional dominance of a disciplinary, mechanistic self-image 
in management studies, whereby the field drew its boundaries in such a way as to 
exclude anything ’other’ than this.” (Tsoukas & Cummings, 1997, p. 655) 
 
Ethical and intellectual virtues 
 
Eikeland suggests that the Aristotelian “gnoseology2 allows for reconsidering and 
reintegrating ways of knowing: traditional, practical, tacit, emotional, experiential, 
intuitive, etc., marginalised and considered insufficient by modernist [and post-modernist] 
thinking” (Eikeland, 2012, p. 20—21).  
 
Ethics and ethical virtues 
 
For the purpose of this discussion I refer to the main Aristotelian treaty on ethics i.e. 
the Nicomachean Ethics (1926) (I do not consider two other treatises, the Eudemian 
Ethics and the Magna Moralia as the coverage is quite similar considering the purpose of 
this article). Many excellent sources are available and in the following highly 
summarized introduction to ethics I mostly refer to Kraut (2012). For Aristotle, ethics 
(and ethical virtues such as courage, temperance, friendship, justice, fairness, … and 
prudence (phronêsis)) is intimately linked to the ultimate “end” of man, that is improving 
our lives and achieving happiness and well-being (eudaimonia) both for individuals and 
for the society. Ethics is the condition for making righteous actions possible which in 
turn enable the development of right habits and, in turn, enable the development of good 
character (aretê) (disposition (hexis) involving conscious choice) leading to achieve 
happiness.  
 
Ethics is thus practical knowledge rooted on experience and “good action” oriented 
rather than just theoretical knowledge. Practical wisdom (phronêsis), being both an 
ethical virtue AND an intellectual virtue (Eikeland, 2008, p. 53), must be acquire through 
practice and is not just about applying general understanding to particular occasions – 
                                                        
2 For Eikeland (2007, p. 347) gnoseology, by contrast to epistemology, involves broader notion of 
knowledge. Epistêmê is just one form of gnôsis. 
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in his description of different types of virtuous persons Aristotle mention good leaders 
showing phronêsis (Aristotle, 1926, 1144b). Two aspects should be emphasized: 1) 
every ethical virtue is a balanced condition to both excess and deficiency (Aristotle, 
1926, 1106a26—b28); and 2) ethical theory does not offer a decision procedure as 
ethics cannot be reduced to a system of rules although some rules are uninfringeable. 
Ethical theory illuminates the nature of virtue but what a virtuous agent must do in 




Eikeland (2007, 2008, 2012) and Eikeland & Nicolini (2011) aptly discuss Aristotle 
“gnoseology” (Eikeland, 2007) and emphasize that the limitations of the modern and 
post-modern appropriation of Aristotle philosophy3, especially with regards to the lack 
of understanding of nuances between the various concepts (virtues, ways of knowing 
and knowledge forms) and the willingness to categorize these concepts as being 
independent and therefore miss a fundamental point: for Aristotle, and for the move 
beyond dichotomous thinking, here theory vs. practice, “Theôría was not just speculation 
and calculation from a separate and insulated observatory”. While meaning “something 
like studying for the purpose of understanding and truth, without intervening, and without 
the study being subordinated to or serving to promote any immediate plans for specific 
actions of any kind, […] acquired, practical, participant experience (Empeiría) was 
necessary” (Eikeland, 2008, p. 46—47).  
 
Drawing on Eikeland (2007; 2012) we can summarize some key aspects of Aristotle 
gnoseology.   
 
Relational ways of knowing 
 
Aristotle’s thinking about knowledge is fundamentally and explicitly relational. The 
knower and the known always relate to each other in a specific way. Relationships 
between means and ends are also specific to the different ways of knowing. The ethico-
political consequences of the different ways of knowing are also explicitly considered.  
 
Two forms of “theory” and epistêmê 
 
“…epistêmê, that is, for knowledge that was stabilised and pretty secure, about subjects 
that were for the most part or always stable and regular themselves” (Eikeland, 2007, p. 
350).  
                                                        
3 See Eikeland, 2007, p. 347. And e.g. “Scientific methods are usually specialised techniques quite different 
from and extraneous to the ways of producing knowledge prevalent in our everyday lives. This goes even for 
the “post-modernist”, relativist, and constructivist alternatives gradually becoming mainstream, which often 
seem to move to the opposite extreme of making all forms of knowledge epistemologically equivalent. But 
these modernist, or post-modernist, ways of thinking are insufficient for understanding both knowledge and 
ethics.” (Eikeland, 2007, p. 348) 
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The first form, called epistêmê1 or theôría, where like in grammar there is no 
physical distance between the knower and the known. “This means that the subjects 
studied – our own forms of practice – must be “reified” reflectively in order to be 
grasped, since they are not really outside us or outside our practices at all” (Eikeland, 
2007, p. 351; Eikeland, 2012, p. 24). Furthermore, “Theôría… is about proceeding from 
within an activity, making its “grammar” explicit, opening new possibilities for action, and 
informing mindful, caring, and wise conduct. … When conceived and formulated after a 
grammatical model, theory as “Theôría” thus becomes a resource to be used in action and 
for action to produce emancipatory visibilisation and expansive articulation” (Eikeland & 
Nicolini, 2011, p. 169).  
 
The second form, called theôrêsis or epistêmê2 is “based on observation at a 
distance. Theôrêsis relates to external objects without intervening. The relation implied 
between the knower and the known, is difference, distance, separation, non-interaction, 
and non-interference (ex. astronomy)” (Eikeland, 2007, p. 349; Eikeland, 2012, p. 21).  
 
Forms of “practice” 
 
“For Aristotle, praxis knowledge represents a relationship between colleagues sharing 
common standards for how to go about their professional activities“ (Eikeland, 2007, p. 
351; Eikeland, 2012, p. 26).  
 
Praxis1, dialogue & dialectics: “the way of learning or research, moving “up” from 
how things appear to us phenomenologically to an articulated insight in basic principles 
… searching patterns, similarities and differences in our accumulated practical 
experience…” (Eikeland, 2007, p. 352; Eikeland, 2012, p. 27). However, “critical dialogue 
needs relief from immediate pressure to act” (Eikeland, 2012, p. 29), and “a permanent 
skholê (leisure - open, free space - school) embedded in practical settings is needed, making 
it possible to develop, unfold, and articulate the "grammars" of different social settings” 
(Eikeland, 2006, p. 18).   
 
Praxis2, phrónêsis: ”the way down from “theory” to “practice” … the practical 
enactment is often immediate and spontaneous … but in other fields where the practice is 
not equally standardised and “automated”, for example in ethics, the “application” of 
general competence or of the knowledge of principles provided by ethical virtues like 
justice, courage, friendliness, honesty, etc., needs deliberation or phrónêsis, trying to find 
out how to act in the most just or fair way towards someone right here and now.” 
(Eikeland, 2007, p. 352; Eikeland, 2012, p. 31; text emphasized by us).   
 
While not discussed here, other forms of knowledge and ways of knowing (i.e. 
pathos, khrêsis, poíêsis) are fully part of Aristotle gnoseology. The reader can refer e.g. 
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to Eikeland, 2007, p. 348; Eikeland, 2008, p. 526; Eikeland, 2012, p. 20 for further 
development on the matter.  
 
In the current project management context of practice and research, practitioners 
tend to emphasize mostly epistêmê1 and praxis2, and poíêsis (use of technical 
knowledge), these knowledge forms being supported by professional bodies codes of 
ethics and conducts. Scholars tend to focus on epistêmê2 and praxis1. This dichotomy 
between the two must be overcome. Aristotle makes clear that, in order to fully acquire 
practical wisdom, prudence (phronêsis) one must become both ethically virtuous and 
practically wise through 1) the development of proper habits (ethical virtues, not part of 
the reasoning soul but following reason) and 2) when aptitude to reasoning  (intellectual 
virtues) is fully developed. But this development is not sequential, and Aristotle states 
that ethical virtue is fully developed only when integrated with phronêsis (Aristotle, 
1926, 1144b14—17).  
 
The mediating role of praxis and phrónêsis 
 
Theory and practice 
 
At the heart of the mediation between ethical and intellectual virtues is phrónêsis 
(and praxis), practical wisdom being both an ethical and a intellectual virtue (Eikeland, 
2008, p. 53). But as briefly shown in the above section introducing the intellectual 
virtue, praxis (as a way of knowing activity including an ethical commitment to 
eudaimonia) and phrónêsis (as a knowledge form) have also a mediating and integrative 
role in the relation theory and practice.  
 
For Aristotle (1926), the possession of three intellectual virtues (tékhnê (artistic or 
technical knowledge, craft), epistêmê (as theoretike) (“theoretical” knowledge) and 
Phrónêsis (practical wisdom, prudence, but includes both intellectual excellence AND 
excellence of character), along with the possession of ethical virtues, enable an 
individual to achieve eudaimonia (well-being, happiness). Eudaimonia actually requires 
activity, action, exhibiting virtue (good character), and excellence in reason (rational 
activity). Theoretical or Philosophical wisdom (sophia) and intuitive reason or 
intelligent intuition (nous) do not consider the means to human happiness at all, for it 
does not ask how anything comes into existence. Practical wisdom (phrónêsis) does this 
(Aristotle, 1926, 1143b). Phrónêsis, as knowledge form, is developed through a specific 
type of empeiria (practical acquired experience), a “way of knowing as activity” named 
praxis (Eikeland, 2008, p. 526). Vazquez offers a clear and simple definition of the term 
when he wrote:  
 
“Praxis…is the central category of the philosophy which is not merely an interpretation 
of the world, but is also a guide to its transformation…” (Vazquez, 1977, p. 149). 
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Praxis is a particular form of activity, a reflexive activity underlying rational action. It 
is concerned with change, is present and future oriented, requires anticipation of the 
effect of action, rather than the interpretation of past or prior event (Vazquez, 1977, p. 
169; Warry, 1992, p. 156). Praxis is “a specific form of activity based on knowledge 
informed by theory and performed according to certain ethical and moral principles for 
political ends.” (Warry, 1992, p. 157). Praxis offers an important focus for practitioners 
and researchers in social science, one in which theory is integrated with practice at the 
point of intervention. Simply stated, praxis can serve as a common ground for those 
interested in basic and applied research by providing knowledge of the reality in which 
action, informed by theory, takes place (Warry, 1992, p. 156). 
 
We can now see the full quality of praxis. It is not simply action based on reflection. It 
is action that embodies certain qualities. These include a commitment to eudaimonia 
(well-being, happiness) and the search for truth, and respect for others. It is the action of 
people who are free, who are able to act for themselves. Moreover, praxis is always 
risky. It requires that a person “makes a wise and prudent practical judgement about how 
to act in this situation” (Carr & Kemmis, 1986, p. 190 quoted in Smith, 1999, 2011). 
Praxis as such aims at the liberation of individuals or communities from the alienating 
aspects of everyday practice subject to the hegemony of the rationalist forces 
constraining every day actions or activities. (Warry, 1992, p. 157; Frankenberg, 1988, p. 
326—327). As Warry puts it:  
 
“Praxis research requires the development of non-alienating methodologies that are 
dialogic and participatory in nature. […]. Praxis, then, is not simply activity, but a 
specific form of activity-activity based on knowledge informed by theory and performed 
according to ethical and moral principles for political ends. Habermas and Gadamer 
both point to “emancipatory praxis”, which appeals to communicative practice aimed 
at overcoming incommensurable beliefs. Emancipatory praxis is a specific type of moral 
and political activity aimed at the liberation of individuals or communities from 
alienating aspects of everyday practices.” (Warry, 1992, p. 157, underlined by us) 
 
With regards to knowledge, competence and ways of knowing as activities (i.e. 
practice), Eikeland (2008) explains that “knowledge and competence is increasingly 
developed from within practical contexts…making organisational learning in work places 
and all cooperative endeavours – i.e. collective efforts, experiential learning and 
improvement – increasingly important in general” (pp. 21—22). This relation between 
knowing and practicing is also acknowledged by Weisinger & Salipante (2000): "The 
knowing is bound with the practicing of seemingly mundane actions … knowing as situated 
learning and practicing" (p. 387). The logic of “Knowing-in-Practice” is fully realized 
through “Knowing-as-Practicing” following recursive logic between “theorizing practice 
and practicing theory” and the fact that “theorizing practice is itself a practice” (Feldman 
& Orlikowski, 2011, p. 1250). Van de Ven & Johnson in their plea in favor of engaged 
scholarship argue that  
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“To bridge the gap between theory and practice, we need a mode of inquiry that 
converts the information provided by both scholars and practitioners into actions that 
address problems of what to do in a given domain.” (Van de Ven & Johnson, 2006, p. 
803) 
 
As Eikeland (2008, p. 87) puts it, “Only in praxis, not in the study of external nature, 
the student and the studied, the knower and the known, coincide.”  
 
 Praxis, phrónêsis and ethics 
 
For Aristotle, praxis, phrónêsis and ethics are inseparable. The aspects of values, 
ethics are fully embedded in the teleological perspective, the quest for eudaimonia. As 
Aristotle (1926, 1140b 6) put it: "while making has an end other than itself, action 
cannot; for good action itself is its end". Tsoukas & Cummings (1997) explain: "there is an 
internal relationship between acting and the standards in terms of which acting is judged, 
which is not there when producing artifacts." (Tsoukas & Cummings, 1997, p. 666). For 
Aristotle, the central role is played by phrónêsis because, in human actions, the moral 
virtues and practical knowledge go together: "it is impossible to be practically wise 
without being good" (1926, 1144a 18). Prudence (phrónêsis, practical wisdom) involves 
"knowing the right values and being able to put them into practice in concrete situations". 
(Tsoukas & Cummings, 1997, p. 666). As phrónêsis (practical wisdom, prudence) is both 
intellectual excellence and excellence of character, we cannot be intellectuality prudent 
(phronimoi) without being ethically good (Eikeland, 2008, p. 59). Phrónêsis cannot be 
acquired alone independently from other ethical virtues. Thus it is impossible to 
separate phrónêsis from other ethical virtues: “we cannot be prudent without being good 
and we cannot be fully good without being prudent, taking the particulars of the situation 
into account” (Eikeland, 2008, p. 64).  
 
The focus of the particulars of the situation leads Tsoukas & Cummings (1997, p. 
666) to ask the question “Apart from being inherently value-laden, what is it about 
practical matters that requires human agents to have practical wisdom instead of merely 
scientific or craft knowledge?” Referring to Aristotle, Nussbaum (1990, pp. 70-75) 
indicates three reasons: 1) practical matters change over time, and new problems call 
for new responses, 2) practical matters are inherently ambiguous, 3) he observes that 
“Aristotle suggests that the concrete ethical case may simply contain some ultimately 
particular and non-repeatable elements” (p. 74). Kondrat further says:  
 
"Praxis is the form of reasoning appropriate to social, political, or other interactive 
contexts in which the individual, drawing on experience to provide a grasp of the 
immediate situation, reasons how to act prudently and correctly in a given set of 
circumstances. Prudence supersedes effectiveness as the relevant virtue in such cases. 
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Indeed, the prudent person may be called on to make choices among several potentially 
effective (or equally ineffective) courses of action." (Kondrat, 1992, p. 239). 
 
Another question immediately comes to mind concerning the kind of rationality 
mobilized by human agents in the course of action: Are they differentiating or 
reconciling formal abstract rationality (Kondrat, 1992; Toulmin, 2002) and substantive 
rationality (Kondrat, 1992), situated reasoning, espoused theory and theory-in-use 
(Argyris & Schön, 1974), macro and micro level of organizational routines and 
capabilities (Salvato & Rerup, 2011), performative and ostensive dimensions of routines 
(Dionysiou & Tsoukas, 2013), with regards to uncertainty about the mode of action they 
adopt in specific situations? Warry offers an authoritative answer with regards to the 
mediating role of praxis and phrónêsis (both rooted on empeiría – practical acquired 
experience), between past and future, between poeisis & tékhnê and theôría & epistêmê, 
as well as between two kind of activities (aísthêsis – perception) and (enérgeia – 
perfecting actualization): 
 
"Gadamer's observation that understanding and interpretation must be integrated into 
the "moment" of application is critical (Gadamer, 1975, p. 273—274; see also 
Bernstein, 1983, p. 159). Praxis, as a particular form of activity, can serve as a focal 
point through which the discursive testing of theory is grounded through decision 
making and experience (Habermas, 1973, p. 20). Simply stated, praxis can serve as a 
common ground for those interested in basic and applied research by providing 
knowledge of the reality in which action, informed by theory takes place." (Warry, 
1992, p. 156).  
 
Thus, praxis and phrónêsis, in their mediating role serve as focal point through 
which dichotomies (ethical and intellectual virtues, theory & practice…) are integrated, 
and have been recognized as "emancipatory" (Habermas, 1971, p. 314; Gadamer, 1975), 
and offering "a way of reflecting on disjuncture between the formal rationality and the 
substantive rationality" (Kondrat, 1992, p. 253). Project management authors such as 
Cicmil & Hodgson (quoting Balck, 1994, p. 2 in Cicmil & Hodgson, 2006, p. 13), 
Blomquist et al. (2010, p. 9) and Lalonde et al. (2012, p. 428) have acknowledged a 
similar view. As Eikeland (2008, p. 87) puts it, “Only in praxis, not in the study of external 
nature, the student and the studied, the knower and the known, coincide.”  
 
Reconciling means and ends, facts and values 
 
An important aspect connected to the mediating role of praxis and phrónêsis and to 
what Taylor (1993, p. 57) calls closing “the pronetic gap”, is that the Aristotelian 
tradition enables us to specify how to “reconnect Means and Ends, Facts and Values” and 
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to move beyond “a dualistic way of thinking” involved by the modern dualism4 (Tsoukas 
& Cummings, 1997, p. 668) about doing (practice) and thinking (theory, knowledge & 
competence development), factual statements and evaluative judgments.  
 
We need to start from Aristotle’s teleological view of the world. For him, human 
agents and natural things are defined for the sake of some functions or ends (purposes 
and ultimately eudaimonia). For instance, from a factual statement such as “He/She (i.e. 
project manager (PM)) meets recurrently and successfully the project objectives” we can 
infer the evaluative judgment “s(he) is a good PM”. Teleologically, classifying someone as 
a PM is to think about the purposes, the ends, s(he) pursues with regards to the 
functions or roles s(he) fulfils or the way s(he) is expected to behave, “not conceiving 
[him/her] as ahistorical selves or abstract individuals” (Tsoukas & Cummings, 1997, p. 
670). Thus calling a PM “good” is to make a factual statement about what an 
acknowledged “good” PM does, and not referring to a list of attributes he/she should 
meet. A concept such as “good” is not an abstract entity or category in a classification 
system, but is embedded in the activity (including the related necessary “means” to 
perform the activity and to achieve the ends, with the underlying idea of doing (praxis) 
and doing well (eupraxia)5), particular context and situation (Feyerabend, 1987, p. 113). 
Calling a particular action “good” means what a “good” PM would (is expected) do in the 
situation (i.e. connecting “appropriate” means to ends) and is therefore making a factual 
statement (MacIntyre, 1985, p. 59; Tsoukas & Cummings, 1997, p. 670) reconciling facts 
and values.  
 
Ethics is politics 
 
Developing ethical and intellectual virtues, and practice and theory, is done by 
entering the tradition of a community of practitioners6 (MacIntyre, 1985; Schön, 1987; 
Brown & Duguid, 1991) sharing common goals, i.e. ends, will, wish, or want and opinion 
(Eikeland, 2008, p. 87, 121) and way of achieving them (means). Being part of the 
community (i.e. Polis) doesn’t involve blind acceptance of standards, conventions, norms 
(nomos – laws) but at the same time the acceptance of historically developed laws and 
collective dialogues, debates, deliberations about them leading to possibly changing 
                                                        
4 Dualistic refers here to dualism, and not to duality. “In contrast to dualism, duality implies that we regard 
an entity as being both constitutive and constituting, such as takes place in the case of recursivity (Giddens, 
1979)”. (Hernes & Bakken, 2003, p. 1525). 
5 The distinction between ends and means in Aristotle is not an easy topic, and is linked to the four 
Aristotelian causes (material, formal, efficient (the near only one considered by moderns and post-
moderns), and final (e.g. Mann (2009).  For an in-depth discussion see e.g. Eikeland, 2008, p.194—196).  
6 For Aristotle, “praxis is not only individual, however. Collective praxis is possible when we follow common 
standards, and adjust to each other communicatively, i.e. through establishing mutual and common 
understandings of how things should be done in “concord” (homónoia in EN1167a22-b16, EE1241a16—34), 
as e.g. in grammatical regulations of language use, or when musicians and dancers play according to a 
common score, or improvise, tuning in on each other knowing the basic principles of the music and the 
dance” (Eikeland, 2008, p. 87). 
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them (Solomon, 1992; Tsoukas & Cummings, 1997, p. 670). As Castoriadis points out for 
ancient Greek conception of politics:  
 
“If the human world were fully ordered, either externally or through its own 
“spontaneous operation”, if human laws were given by God or by nature or by the 
“nature of society”; or by the “laws of history”, then there would be no room for political 
thinking and no sense in asking what the proper law is or what justice is. [...] If a full 
and certain knowledge (episteme) of the human domain were possible, politics would 
immediately come to an end [...]”. (Castoriadis, 1991, p.104) 
 
Tsoukas & Cummings (1997, p. 671) rightly enhances: “…in the social domain in 
general, and in organizations in particular, uncertainty, ambiguity and politics must go 
together”. Thus, through praxis and phrónêsis, “Ethics is politics inasmuch as the 
achievement of human happiness” (Strang, 1998, p. 1).   
 
Tenets of a general theory of “standards” 
 
A direct implication of the above discussion about the mediating role of praxis and 
phrónêsis with regards to their inseparability with ethics, to theory and practice, to 
means and ends, facts and values, ethics and politics is that the development of 
intellectual virtues should be made through individual and collective practical acquired 
experience (empeiría) and perfecting actualization (enérgeia) and not just through 
perception (aísthêsis), abstract, distant and external observation.  On this basis, the way 
of conceptualizing “universals” or “general theory” has to be made clear. According to 
Eikeland (2008, pp. 25), three kind of traditions can be considered: 1) Covering laws 
(deductive nomological or hypothetico-deductive model), 2) Statistical generalizations 
and, 3) Standards. Here standards can be defined as “fixed points or “ideals” for 
practitioners within certain areas, saying something about what it means to perform a 
certain kind of activity competently or, according to a, saying something about what it 
means to perform a certain kind of activity competently or, according to certain quality.” 
(p. 26). The meaning doesn’t include standards understood as just average norms, 
arbitrary or imposed by external bodies (e.g Brunsson et al, 2000). Here, such standards 
are neither qualitatively nor quantitatively influenced by any counter facts. Standards 
are made by the success of virtuoso practitioners, and they “change when someone finds 
a better way of doing, making or using something”. The key characteristics of such 
standards are that “not everybody should or could realize them equally or fully […] their 
non-arbitrary character, their immanence as patterns to practice, and “ways-of-doing-
things”, and their practical inevitability in human life as either implicit or explicit, vague or 
more exact standards of measurement, as standards of validity of excellence” (p. 26). 
Contrary to arbitrary standards, which can be conventional, unnecessary, or enforced, 
non-arbitrary standards are necessary as they express an existential necessity that is 
what it means to be or to do something. Such standards are to be observed practically 
from within the practice and they are impossible to be observed just from outside, by 
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perception. The position of the “observer” is thus quite different between these three 
traditions. In the case of “standards”, the observer is the practitioner, the native, dealing 
with things and theorizing his/her own practice, and there is no dichotomy between 
practice and theory (Eikeland, 2008, p. 27).   
 
Three keys points can be enlightened briefly here. First, being a competent project 
manager is not just about having some theoretical knowledge, experience and being able 
to demonstrate practical skills and past performance.  It is about being able to articulate 
in specific project situations and contexts, both theory and practice, ethical and 
intellectual virtues, through praxis1 and praxis2, phrónêsis and deliberation and 
dialogue. Being recognized as “good” project manager, by peers and by the broader 
“stakeholders” is the result of above way-of-doing-things. This raises questions about 
the way we currently assess the competence of project managers through the 
credentialing systems. Second, becoming a competent project manager is done through 
the practice, and experience (not short-cut…) and by the participation to community of 
practitioners. This points to the educational and training system in place and its 
relevance. Third, the field does exist beyond Audet’s above definition. The field 
encompasses the community of practitioners (polis), the standards (as defined above, 
and in relation to both general theory and practice) and ethics, this in relation to its 
contribution to eudaimonia. And this introduces questions about the relationship 
research and practice. I leave these questions open to debate and deliberation for now.  
 
Illustration and discussion 
 
I would like now to succinctly illustrate some insights we can gain from the 
Aristotelian’s ethics in studying the current state of ethical affairs of the project 
management field. An appropriate ground is to consider the representative codes of 
ethics and professional conduct offered by two Professional Bodies i.e. Project 
Management Institute (PMI, 2006), and Association for Project Management (APM, 
2011).  
 
Inside PMI and APM codes of ethics and professional conducts: deontology and 
consequentialism 
 
PMI Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct  (PMI, 2006) is a “standard”7 and 
followed the American National Standard Institute processes for its development (PMI, 
2006, Appendix A2, p. 7). This standard provides the vision of what practitioners are 
committed “to doing what is right and honorable” (§1.1, p. 1). The purpose of the 
                                                        
7 What is a standard? “A standard is a document, established by consensus and approved by a recognized 
body, which provides, for common and repeated use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for activities or their 
results, aimed at the achievement of the optimum degree of order in a given context. Developed under a 
process based on the concepts of consensus, openness, due process, and balance, PMI standards provide 
guidelines for achieving specific project, program and portfolio management results.” (Source: PMI, 
http://www.pmi.org/PMBOK-Guide-and-Standards/Standards-Overview.aspx. Accessed 27 August 2013). 
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standard is to “instill confidence in the project management profession and to help an 
individual to become a better practitioner” (§1.1, p. 1). The standard applies to any 
practitioners related in a way or another to PMI: members, holders of certification(s), 
practitioners applying to a certification, or non-members volunteering to serve on a PMI 
project / activity.  Four core values are emphasized as being the most important for the 
project management community: responsibility, respect, fairness and honesty. The 
standard describes for each of these values aspirational (expectation of conduct that we 
have of ourselves and fellow practitioners as professionals) and mandatory conduct 
(firm requirements).  Each value is related to “our duty as practitioners”.  Decisions have 
to be made and actions have to be taken in the best interest of “society, public safety and 
environment” (§ 2.2.1). Competence (i.e. “background, experience, skills and 
qualifications”) to carry an assignment is mentioned briefly in § 2.2.2. The way the 
document is written, we may understand that the following three values “”respect, 
fairness and honesty” support the value “responsibility” in decision-making and action 
taken. I must highlight that the word “practitioner” as defined in the glossary in 
appendix B1: “A person engaged in an activity that contributes to the management of a 
project, portfolio, or program, as part of the project management profession”, conveys a 
broad meaning (i.e. “the native”) including what we use to name “practitioners”, 
“consultants”, “scholars” and so on…  
 
APM Code of Professional Conduct (APM, 2011) states, in its introductory paragraph, 
that “ (APM has) a code of conduct to set standards, guide the member and raise the level 
of trust and confidence of the public in the profession”.  The code is aimed at APM 
members (§1.2). The importance of public benefits is highlighted (§ 1.1).  APM members 
are deemed to apply their competence (knowledge, skills and experience) 
“commensurate” with their grade of membership” (§1.3) (assuming here that APM grade 
of membership system mirror the members’ level competence). The purpose of the code 
(§2) is to set standards of professional conduct (§4) (relevant (i.e. what can reasonably 
expected) competence according to APM Body of Knowledge and APM Competence 
Framework), and ethical behaviour (doing things “right”, compliant to the norms of 
ethical behaviours) (§7).  Members must fulfil personal responsibilities (e.g. honesty, 
confidentiality, sound judgment, professional development, adequate expertise) (§5) as 
well as responsibility to the profession and to the association (e.g. promote the 
association and the profession, development of staff and colleagues) (§6).  
 
As aptly noted by Harrison (2004), we usually consider two main approaches of 
normative / prescriptive ethics: deontology and consequentialism. Deontological ethics 
(from Greek deon, "obligation, duty"), while linked to antique codes of conducts such as 
Ten Commandments, takes its modern root in Kant moral theory and the two principles 
of “universalisability” (sic) (A principle has universalisability if everyone can act on it” 
(Shick & Vaughn, 1999, p. 344), and “reversability” (sic) (A principle has reversability if 
the person acting on it would be willing to have everyone act on it”) (Ibid.). We can 
recognize here the principles underlying PMI Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct, 
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aiming at “universalisability” i.e. willing to have everyone act the way “PMI 
practitioners” are deemed to act (e.g. use of “global project management community” in 
the document) and “reversability” i.e. willing to have everyone acting the way “PMI 
practitioners” are acting towards themselves (e.g. the “Persons to Whom the Code 
Applies”, §1.2, p. 1; “Respect”, § 3.2.4, p. 4))). Furthermore, PMI Code of Ethics and 
Professional Conduct fall in the middle of a spectrum between prescriptive and 
aspirational (Farrell & Cobbin, 2000) (e.g. “Aspirational and Mandatory Conduct”, §1.5, p. 
2).  Consequentialism “also sometimes termed teleology, is directed towards securing the 
right outcome” (Harrison, 2004, p. 2).  Consequentialist ethics is seen as utilitarianism, 
i.e. “the philosophy of the greatest good for the greatest number” (Harrison, 2004, p. 2).  
APM Code of Professional Conduct has, to some extent, this vision (e.g. “doing things 
“right” (§7)).  
 
Moving beyond the conflicts between “competing duties” and “duty vs. 
outcomes”: the Aristotelian perspective 
 
However, despite their usefulness, and while “both deontological approaches and 
consequentialist approaches are regularly construed as opposite sides of the same coin; 
duty versus outcomes” (Harrison, 2004, p. 2), the APM and PMI codes are, to some extent, 
focusing of the practitioner’s question “what is my duty?” (Harrison, 2004, p. 2). 
Referring to the previous section, we see that the focus is on means and facts, despite 
mentioning some ends and values. As mentioned by Harrison, “Aristotle was not 
concerned with resolving conflicts between competing duties, such as duty to society versus 
duty to client” (Harrison, 2004, p. 1) (e.g. APM §5.1.3 “act in the best interests of their 
employer and clients in all business and professional matters, taking account of the wider 
public interest concerns and those of any employee or colleague”, and PMI “…decisions… 
actions based on the best interests of society…” § 2.2.1, p. 2 vs. comment “duty of loyalty to 
our employer” § 4.3.2, p. 5).  Aristotelian ethics goes beyond the two normative ethics, 
and we can easily see that the missing part is related to the development of “good 
character”, i.e. ethical virtues, of the project management practitioner (as well as the 
development of intellectual virtues as presented earlier).  The development of “good 
character” is linked to experience and is done in relation to a community of practitioners 
(something not directly mentioned in PMI code apart from the use of “fellow 
practitioners” throughout the document, but stated more specifically in APM code 
(keeping his/her own skills up-to-date, §5.1.5, and “encourage and assist the professional 
development of staff and colleagues”, § 6.1.5). As explained above, being “good” is related 
to reconciling means and ends (and quest for eudaimonia) and facts and values. The 
“good” practitioner (factual statement, evaluative judgment), in Aristotelian’s ethics, 
asks the questions “why should I undertake my duty?” (ends, contributing to 
eudaimonia) and “how ought I act in this situation?” (“good” action, means, values), 
rather than “what is my duty?”.  
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Taking this deeper Aristotelian lens leads to suggest a new perspective for our 
project management codes of ethics, designing them shorter and focusing on values 
rather than on means, facts, regulations, violations, sanctions or prohibitions (e.g. the 
wording in § 3 of the APM code; see comment in § 1.5, p. 2; and e.g. §2.3.3 to § 2.3.5, p. 3, 
PMI code) and probably more inspirational, more in line with the ends. An excellent 
example is provided by the Advertising Federation of Australia (AFA) Agency Code of 
Ethics.  There is not much to change to embrace it in the project management field.  
 
“WHY DO ADVERTISING AGENCIES NEED A CODE OF ETHICS? 
We are fortunate to occupy a role in society where business, creativity and the 
media overlap. This role brings with it both opportunities and responsibilities. Our 
industry relies on trust. We need to act with integrity to gain trust – from our clients, 
colleagues, suppliers, consumers and our critics. Following this guide will help you 
avoid conflict or the possibility of bringing yourself and your agency into disrepute. 
HOW TO BEHAVE? 
Every day we can be faced with ethical dilemmas. These guidelines will help you to 
do the right thing. Ethics can’t be imposed. They have to grow from within each of us. 
And be understood by all of us. 
THE CODE: WHAT WE BELIEVE 
01 Stand up for what you believe is right. 
02 Honour all agreements. 
03 Don’t break the law. Don’t bend the law. 
04 Respect all people. 
05 Strive for excellence in everything you do. 
06 Give clients your best advice, without fear or favour. 
07 Look after your colleagues. 
08 Compete fairly. 
09 Think before you act. 




The consequences of the Aristotelian ethics lens are important as highlighted above. 
For instance, as matter of short illustration, and even if not fully consciously articulated 
by the Professional Bodies, the relation between PMI Code (deontological, focusing on 
duty) and the way the “PMI” knowledge is structured (standards centred on processes to 
comply with in order to do the job articulating the knowledge areas), and between APM 
Code (consequentialism, focusing on the outcome) and the way APM mainly focuses on 
topics describing characteristics such as contextual, skills, tools & techniques, and some 
general management aspects one should rely on in order to deliver the “right” outcome 
is all but neutral. This leaves open the deliberation about what could be an “Aristotelian” 
project management body of knowledge! 
 
Page 16 - 20 
With the limited space allotted for this work, I provide, as way of concluding 
comments, an overview outlining avenues for further researches and works to be done.  
As noticed earlier, ethics is inseparable of the development of the practitioners (i.e. 
ethical and intellectual virtues development and the role of experience) and of the 
existence of communities of practice (ethics is politics). Therefore revisiting and /or 
redesigning according to an Aristotelian way the codes of ethics and professional 
conducts for project management, in order to move beyond the normative limitations of 
classical deontological (conflict between competing duties, means) or consequentialism 
(focusing on the “right” outcome to the detriment of duties, means) approaches (both, in 
fact, leading to a disconnection means – ends, and to confuse project outcome for an 
“end” while it is just a mean to possibly reach higher end such eudaimonia), implicates 
revisiting and/or redesigning, on the basis of the “why?” and “how?” questions, the 
whole articulation between ethics, competency frameworks, bodies of knowledge, the 
role of research and dialogical integration of theory and practice (scholars, consultants, 
and practitioners are all considered as being part of the “practice” – as already suggested 
in the PMI Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct), education programs, project 
management credentials, and ultimately (or first and foremost!) the role of the 
Professional Bodies in project management.   
 
Thus, not unexpectedly, investigating the very nature and philosophical foundations 
of our practice leads to suggestions for building on, revisiting and redesigning the 
existing field structures and agencies (Giddens, 1979), and to a multitude of possible 
researches and works. Each of the above aspect may potentially keep busy, within the 
community, number of “good” practitioners, in the broad sense of the word, i.e. the 
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